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The writer is a senior fellow and director of the Africa programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Angola’s dramatic exit from the oil cartel Opec+ late last year was interpreted as a historic pivot to the west. The less understood but equally important factor in its departure was the diverging impact of oil production quotas between African countries and their counterparts in the Middle East, Asia and Russia.
Despite oil prices being high since 2021, most major African oil producers are not experiencing a boom. In the short term, this is affecting their fiscal positions. Longer term, it will reduce their access to the financial resources required to undertake development projects and transition to low-emissions economies.
Oil prices reached an average price of $82 per barrel in 2023, way above the $65-$70 benchmark set by most governments. Yet the 10 major African oil-rich countries which have been exporters since at least the year 2000 have lower trade surpluses than they did in 2010, when oil prices were $79 per barrel. They also have heavier debt burdens — on average about 85 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, many of their non-African Opec+ peers have larger trade surpluses and lower debt to GDP ratios.
On the supply side of this growing divergence, output among the major African oil-producing countries is in decline. Countries including Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Equatorial Guinea have experienced significant contractions in oil output. Nigeria has experienced the most dramatic decline, dropping from about 2.5mn barrels of crude oil a day in 2010 to 1.5mn b/d in 2023.
By contrast, output among non-African Opec+ countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Russia and Kazakhstan has increased. Even conflict-torn Iraq nearly doubled its oil production over the same period.
This decline in Africa can be attributed to years of under-investment. This is due to outdated legislation, tense relations with communities involved in onshore production and even the favourability of alternative jurisdictions within Africa and elsewhere, such as Guyana, now the world’s fastest growing economy.
On the demand side of the equation, the destination for African crude has also changed.
The shale revolution propelled the US to the status of the world’s largest oil producer in 2018, dramatically reducing its imports of African crude oil. The value of Chinese oil imports from major African oil producers also declined by around 28 per cent between 2018 and 2023. This contraction is particularly acute for Algeria, Angola, South Sudan and Libya, which previously relied heavily on the Chinese market. Meanwhile, Chinese imports of oil from non-African Opec+ countries, including Russia, have jumped by 78 per cent.
Europe, still a significant importer of African crude, expects to drastically reduce its oil consumption within the next decade as part of rapid decarbonisation plans. Meanwhile, India is sourcing discounted oil supplies from Russian producers who are locked out of European markets.
The decline in African oil output matters for the world. Despite high global prices, African governments with insufficient oil export earnings are finding it extremely difficult to balance their budgets.
Some climate activists might celebrate the contraction in African oil production. But it will have a negative effect on these countries’ ability to mobilise the finance needed for long-term energy transitions. Already, the African continent has an annual financing gap of $400bn per year until 2030 if it is going to be able to achieve the UN’s sustainable development goals, according to the African Development Bank.
An important source of Africa’s climate and development financing should be the recycling of petrodollars for investments in green sectors such as climate-smart agriculture and renewable energy. This is the playbook of Arab monarchies in the Gulf and of Norwegian politicians, both of whom are deploying oil revenues through hefty sovereign wealth funds into green industries of the future. If wealthier African oil-producing countries are unable to finance their energy transition, poorer ones will struggle even more.
To reduce global warming, the world must ultimately reduce the production and consumption of fossil fuels. This will be a painful process for countries everywhere. But the energy transition could be even more problematic for African nations unable to capture and reinvest the proceeds of their natural resources. In an era of waning support among western taxpayers for government provision of foreign aid in faraway lands, we should be paying more attention to the inability of African petrostates to fund their own development.