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Construction work began this week for a new German army barracks in Lithuania, close to the border with Belarus, which will house some 4,000 Bundeswehr troops by 2027. It is Germany’s first permanent overseas military base since the second world war.
The beginning of the project should have been a celebration of Berlin’s leadership role in bolstering European security more than two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the occasion was eclipsed by a furore over shrinking military support for Ukraine that has displayed Berlin’s weakness not its strength.
Over the weekend it emerged in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper that Germany will drastically shrink its bilateral defence aid for Ukraine from an impressive €7.5bn this year to €4bn next, and a measly €500mn in 2027. There is no money this year for any additional Ukrainian requests for ammunition or spare parts.
Kyiv is the big loser from a 2025 budgetary agreement struck this summer by the three parties in Germany’s dysfunctional coalition government after weeks of acrimonious talks. It has become a victim of the country’s ludicrously rigid constitutional debt brake that limits government deficits. It is glaringly obvious that a fetishist German political debate over debt is preventing the country from addressing its big economic and security challenges.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz insists that Germany will remain Ukraine’s biggest supporter in Europe. He says Berlin will instead provide military aid via a planned $50bn loan agreed in principle by G7 leaders this summer and secured against frozen Russian central bank assets.
Scholz’s argument is a diversion. The $50bn loan is proving difficult technically to implement and is still potentially hostage to political objections, for example from Hungary’s pro-Kremlin government. In any case, it is not German money.
A $50bn loan will not stretch very far since it may need to cover Kyiv’s budgetary shortfall as well as weapons purchases. It is only a fraction of the nearly €300bn that Europe and the US have committed over the past two and a half years, according to the Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker.
It is true that few other donors have made long-term promises. The $61bn package that the US Congress agreed in April could be its last. But Scholz’s position is an invitation for other G7 leaders to also scale back their bilateral aid. Worse is the signal it sends to Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader’s bet is that western resolve will falter. Reducing military help can only encourage him.
Two and half years after its derisory first military aid consignment to Kyiv of 5,000 army helmets, Germany has a good story to tell. It is the second biggest donor of weaponry after the US. It is cranking up its defence industrial machine and is a crucial provider of air defences and artillery ammunition. But Scholz tends to snatch PR defeat from the jaws of victory. His repeated hesitations over sending offensive weaponry, then tanks and now cruise missiles for fear of provoking Russia undermines his commitment to Ukraine’s cause.
Scholz also seems determined to stymie the EU as it seeks a greater role in defence industry collaboration, vital if Europe is to improve its capabilities. The chancellor objected to any discussion of defence projects when EU leaders met in June to review the bloc’s strategic agenda, according to two European diplomats. The European Commission’s ambitions to create a defence industry fund of up to €100bn through joint EU borrowing has met a wall of German resistance.
Scholz seems to veer between strategic clarity and purpose — as with his bold Turning pointor turning point, speech in 2022 soon after Russia’s onslaught — to apprehension and drift. Some critics accuse him of electioneering.
Support for Ukraine is unpopular in eastern Germany where there are regional elections next month. Sahra Wagenknecht, the populist far-left politician who opposes Ukraine aid and has surged in support in the east, has taken credit for the government’s decision to cut it.
As a share of GDP, Germany’s military aid to Kyiv lags behind Denmark, Sweden, the Baltic states, Poland and the Netherlands. It should be doing more not less. Ukraine’s victory — or at least helping it attain a battlefield position where it can secure a just and lasting peace — is fundamental to European security and possibly to the survival of the EU. It should be a top priority for Berlin. Europe needs Germany to step up not step back.